‘Europe 2020’ and the EU Public Procurement and State Aid Rules: Good Intentions That Pave a Road to Hell? by Stefan Martinić & Ana Kozina
207CYELP 12 [2016] 207-249
‘EUROPE 2020’ AND THE EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
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A ROAD TO HELL?
Stefan Martinić and Ana Kozina* 
Summary: In 2010, the European Union launched ‘Europe 2020, a 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ whose goals in 
employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/en-
ergy need to be reached by 2020. Although such a project has unde-
niable benefits, the authors of this paper analyse the shortcomings 
of ‘Europe 2020’ in the field of EU public procurement rules and the 
latter’s interconnected relationship with State aid rules. The paper is 
divided into two main parts. The first part considers whether social 
and environmental considerations in a public tender could lead to a 
violation of the EU’s public procurement and/or State aid rules. The 
paper analyses and presents the possible ways in which social and 
environmental considerations may lead to discrimination, the preven-
tion of which is one of the basic principles of EU law in general and 
public procurement rules in particular. Further, the authors analyse 
the link between public procurement and State aid rules. The sec-
ond part evaluates the public procurement directives and the La Poste 
case to find out whether the new directives create new risks of infring-
ing State aid rules. The paper points to the contradictions between 
public procurement and State aid rules. In doing so, the authors take a 
critical approach to the new public procurement rules and the difficult 
task of achieving simplification, flexibility, legal certainty, greater sus-
tainable and inclusive growth while at the same time not jeopardising 
State aid rules.
1 Introduction 
In February 2016, the largest outlet glacier of the world’s largest 
tropical ice cap retreated, leaving a lake some 86 acres in area and about 
60 metres deep.1 Carbon dioxide levels in the air are at their highest in 
* * The authors are students at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb. First, we 
wish to express our thanks and appreciation to our mentor Filip Kuhta who has extended 
help, guidance and support in the preparation of this paper. Without his help, this paper 
would not have been possible. Second, we would like to thank the Chair of European Public 
Law for their creative ideas and suggestions for various sources of information during the 
European Law Moot Court Competition on the topic of State aid and public procurement 
which inspired us to write this paper
1 NASA, ‘Global Climate Change’ <http://climate.nasa.gov/> accessed 20 January 2016.
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650,000 years.2 The global temperature has risen by 0.8° Celsius since 
1880. Nine of the ten warmest years on record have occurred since 2000.3 
In 2012, the Arctic summer sea ice shrank to the lowest extent on re-
cord.4 The global average sea level has risen over the past 100 years and 
if it continues at this rate it could make the beautiful cities of Amsterdam 
and Venice an attraction only for fish and divers. The amount of global 
forest lost between 2000 and 2012 would cover the combined area of 
Croatia, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Ireland, Slove-
nia, Austria, France, and Denmark.5 In order to change the course of this 
potentially catastrophic climate trend, the world met in December 2015 
in Paris for the United Nations Climate Change Conference.
To make things worse, the planet is not the only thing being hurt. 
Eurostat estimates that 21.9 million men and women in the EU were un-
employed in December 2015.6 The youth unemployment rate in the EU 
in the last quarter of 2015 was 21.4%, while in Croatia, for instance, it 
was 46.3% and in Spain it was a staggering 51.7%.7 As the EU economy 
is still faltering, Eurosceptic and extremist parties in the whole of the EU 
are on the rise. Most notably, the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU, 
and Marine Le Pen is promising to organise a referendum on exit from the 
EU if she is elected President of France in the election in 2017. If both the 
fifth and sixth largest economies in the world indeed leave the European 
Union, it will put the whole EU project in jeopardy.
The EU is trying to make a full economic recovery and return to the 
economic pre-2008 level in order to win popular support at home, while 
at the same time attempting to be the leader on the world stage in tack-
ling climate change. The goals are big, and there is a plethora of possible 
means to achieve them. Some are evident and highly advertised, such as 
the projects ‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth’8 and ‘Youth Guarantee’,9 while, for instance, the two public pro-






6 Eurostat, ‘Unemployment statistics’ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsex-
plained/index.php/
Unemployment_statistics#Main_statistical_findings> accessed 21 February 2016.
7 Eurostat, ‘Euro indicators’ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.
php/File:Table_1_
Youth_unemployment, 2014Q4_(%25).png> accessed 21 February 2016.
8 See more: European Commission, ‘Europe 2020’ <http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/in-
dex_en.htm> accessed 22 February 2016.
9 See more: European Commission, ‘Youth Guarantee’ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/
main.jsp?catId=1079>accessed 22 February 2015.
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It might come as a surprise that public procurement rules (which are 
about how public authorities spend public money when buying goods, 
works or services) are a valuable tool for the EU in achieving its goals. 
However, these rules have a significant financial impact because they 
range from buying IT equipment or providing water, gas and electricity to 
building hospitals or roads. Directive 2014/24/EU of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement10 and Directive 2014/25/EU of 26 February 2014 
on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and 
postal services sectors11 play a key role in the ‘Europe 2020 strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, as one of the market-based in-
struments to be used to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds.12 They were enacted 
in order to increase the efficiency of public spending, facilitating in par-
ticular the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
public procurement and to enable procurers to make better use of public 
money in support of common societal goals.13 
Public procurement affects a substantial share of world trade flows, 
amounting to EUR 1,000 billion per year; it makes up a significant part 
of national economies, adding up to 10-25% of gross domestic product 
(GDP).14 In the EU, the public purchase of goods and services has been 
estimated to account for 16% of GDP.15 For instance, in Croatia the pub-
lic purchase of goods and services amounts to about HRK 40 billion per 
year, which is almost a third of the State’s budget.16 As one Commission 
official put it: ‘you aren’t buying pencils’.17 Since the State is buying with 
10 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 Febru-
ary 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA rel-
evance) [2014] OJ L94/65 (Directive 2014/24/EU).
11 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal ser-
vices sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (Text with EEA relevance) [2014] OJ L 
94/243. The paper will concentrate more on the General Directive 2014/24/EU than on 
the Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU due to the general nature of Directive 2014/24/EU and 
since for the purpose of this paper the differences between the General and the Utilities 
Directive are not important.
12 Recital to Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and 
postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (Text with EEA relevance) 
[2014] OJ L 94/243 (Directive 2014/25/EU), para 4.
13 Recital to Directive 2014/25/EU, para 4.
14 For more details, see: European Commission, ‘Public Procurement’ <http://ec.europa.
eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/> accessed 24 April 2015.
15 ibid.
16 HRT vijesti, ‘Zamjerka javnoj nabavi: Nije najjeftinije uvijek najbolje’ (HRT, 17 March 
2015) <http://vijesti.hrt.hr/276643/tvrtke-imaju-zamjerki-na-sustav-javne-nabave-pona-
jvise-na-kriterij-najnize-cijene-23> accessed 25 April 2015.
17 Dylan M Hughes, ‘The Inter Relationship between the European State Aid and Public 
Procurement Rules: When Does a Government Contractor Gain an “Economic Advantage”?’ 
(2009) EIPA 1, 5.
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the public purse, it should always aim to achieve the best value for mon-
ey and, at the same time, it should foster social justice and protection of 
the environment. 
Unfortunately, in spite of a noble goal and potent means, there might 
still be negative consequences. Hence, questions should be asked about 
whether the implementation of the ‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive growth’ in the public procurement rules has gone 
too far and whether it has led to unwanted consequences coming from 
both the MSs’ and the EU’s legislation in the field of public procurement 
and State aid. In other words, do these good intentions lay a road to hell? 
This could lead to a metaphorical hell if the implementation of the ‘Eu-
rope 2020’ goals in the public procurement rules undermine the basic 
principle of non-discrimination and the rules of State aid.
The original rationale for imposing EU oversight on State aid was to 
prevent countries from deliberately using State aid to benefit their own 
enterprises at the expense of rivals located in other Member States.18 
If a country subsidises national producers of goods for which there is 
international trade, similar subsidies may be granted in retaliation by 
other countries, which in turn creates an escalation of subsidies and 
sets off a potentially wasteful subsidy race.19 Moreover, State aid may 
distort the dynamics of the competitive process; aid may help perpetu-
ate failed business models; it may reduce the incentive to compete; and 
may create moral hazard by encouraging excessive risk taking.20 These 
effects are likely to be even more serious and long lasting than having an 
uneven playing field. In particular, moral hazard is a key concern.21 An 
implicit promise of future aid may affect firms’ incentives by protecting 
them from the adverse consequences of their risk-taking, thereby foster-
ing overly risky behaviour.22 Repeated State aid may eventually create the 
expectation that certain undertakings are ‘too big to fail’ (or too politically 
important to fail), and thus perpetuate overly risky or inefficient business 
practice.23 Therefore, State aid rules are valuable for the European Un-
ion, so any environmental, societal or any other gain should not be offset 
by jeopardising the goals of State aid rules.
Due to the relevance of the project ‘Europe 2020’, public procure-
ment and State aid rules, this paper will analyse the following main ques-
tion: What are the shortcomings of the implementation of ‘Europe 2020’ 
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in the field of EU public procurement rules and in the latter’s relationship 
with EU State aid rules?
In order to answer the main question, the paper will analyse: a) the 
effects of the project ‘Europe 2020’ in the domain of public procurement 
and State aid rules; b) the possible ways in which an MS can misuse 
the project’s goals to the detriment of public procurement and State aid 
rules; and c) the possible risk to State aid rules from the new public pro-
curement directives.
The paper is divided into two main parts. The first part analyses the 
social and environmental considerations in public tenders which were 
brought to the attention of contracting authorities through the project 
‘Europe 2020’. The authors consider whether social and environmental 
considerations in public tenders can lead to a violation of the EU’s public 
procurement and/or State aid rules. The paper analyses and presents 
possible ways in which social and environmental considerations can lead 
to discrimination, the prevention of which is one of the basic principles 
of EU law in general and public procurement rules in particular. Further, 
the authors consider whether the link between public procurement and 
State aid rules has changed due to the implementation of ‘Europe 2020’.
The second part of the paper evaluates the new public procurement 
directives and the La Poste case24 in order to find out whether the new 
directives create new risks of infringing State aid rules. The authors point 
out the contradictions between public procurement and State aid rules. 
In doing so, they take a critical approach to the new public procurement 
rules and their difficult task of achieving simplification, flexibility, legal 
certainty, greater sustainable and inclusive growth while at the same 
time not jeopardising the valuable goals of State aid rules.
2 Social and environmental considerations in a public tender – a 
double-edged sword?
This section analyses the social and environmental considerations in 
public tenders that were brought to the attention of contracting authori-
ties through the project ‘Europe 2020’. The authors consider whether the 
social and environmental considerations in public tenders lead to a viola-
tion of EU public procurement and/or State aid rules.
First, the section describes in what ways social and environmental 
considerations can be manifested in public tenders. Second, it evaluates 
24 Case C-559/12 P French Republic v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2014:217; Ales-
sandro Nucara and Edoardo Gambaro, ‘The La Poste Case: A Guaranteed EPIC Battle’ 
(2013) 3 ESTAL 568-574; Valerie Guigue Koeppen, ‘La Poste: Implied Unlimited State Guar-
antees Under the Loop of State Aid Law’ (2014) 5 JECLP 546-548.
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whether social and environmental considerations in a public tender can 
lead to discrimination. Third, it clarifies how disguised discrimination vio-
lates public procurement rules, and, finally, it demonstrates how a viola-
tion of public procurement rules can lead to a violation of State aid rules. 
2.1 Manifestations of social and environmental considerations
One of the principles of EU public procurement is the compliance of 
performance with obligations in the fields of environmental, social and 
labour law established by the Union, national law, collective agreements 
or by international law.25 But, irrespective of the new directives and the 
push of ‘Europe 2020’, contracting authorities have always been encour-
aged and have always been keen to introduce environmental and social 
considerations above minimum compliance into their purchases. This 
could be done through various stages of procurement procedures.
The first way in which environmental and social considerations can 
be implemented is through technical specifications. As previously men-
tioned, they lay down the characteristics of a public works contract, and 
the services or supplies that are being procured.26 According to the di-
rective, it is allowed to specify ‘environmental and climate performance 
levels’27 of a material and product in general, as well as of production 
methods and the process in any stage of the life cycle,28 as long as those 
requirements are related to the subject matter and are proportionate to 
its value and objectives.29 This means that, for example, a contracting 
authority may demand that the energy supplied comes from renewable 
sources, that paper is 100% recycled or that the food is grown by using 
organic methods.30 Social concerns are explicitly mentioned, demand-
ing that technical specifications for products should be ‘drawn up so as 
25 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 18.
26 It is necessary to emphasise that the required characteristics need to refer to the sub-
ject matter of the contract, not to the general policy or qualities of the operator.  Directive 
2014/24/EU, annex VII.
27 ibid.
28 ‘“Life cycle” means all consecutive and/or interlinked stages, including research and 
development to be carried out, production, trading and its conditions, transport, use and 
maintenance, throughout the existence of the product or the works or the provision of the 
service, from raw material acquisition or generation of resources to disposal, clearance and 
end of service or utilisation’ Directive 2014/24/EU, art 2 indent 20.
29 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 42(1). 
30 For example, in 2010, the Estonian Environment Ministry tendered for cleaning services 
and in the technical specifications demanded that all plastic bags be biodegradable, and 
that the waste be sorted (packaging, organic waste, etc); in Malta, the national body respon-
sible for schools required that a new school building be energy self-sufficient. See European 
Commission, ‘Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement’ (2nd edn, Publica-
tions Office of the European Union 2011) 25, 27. For more on sustainable procurement, 
see Martin Trybus, Roberto Caranta and Gunilla Edelstam EU Public Contract Law: Public 
Procurement and Beyond (3rd edn, Bruylant 2014).
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to take into account accessibility criteria for persons with disabilities or 
design for all users’.31 In the process and production methods, ‘socially 
aware’ technical requirements may be set in order to protect the health 
and safety of workers, demanding a certain way of handling dangerous 
products or measures to avoid accidents at work.32
Contrary to the technical specifications (and award criteria), con-
cerned with and restricted solely to the goods, service or work procured, 
the criteria for qualitative selection covers aspects related to economic 
operators, ie the tenderers-to-be. These criteria manifest themselves in 
two ways. First, they manifest themselves as exclusion grounds, accord-
ing to which it is possible to exclude companies in breach of environmen-
tal, social and labour obligations established by Union, national or inter-
national law.33 The second manifestation is selection criteria regarding 
the technical and professional ability to execute the contract. Contracting 
authorities may require – but only where the qualities of a tenderer are 
important for carrying out a contract – proof of the necessary human 
and technical resources, educational or professional qualifications of the 
staff, previous experience, etc.34
Finally, the contract is to be awarded for the most economically ad-
vantageous tender. The basis of identifying this can be the price or cost, 
usually including the best price-quality ratio in assessing the submitted 
tenders. Environmental and/or social aspects can also be taken as award 
criteria helping to specify this ratio but again they need to be strictly re-
lated to the subject matter of the contract, not to the general policy of the 
economic operator.35 The difference from the technical specifications that 
define the minimum level of performance required is that the contracting 
authority may decide to grant extra points to those tenders that are bet-
ter with regard to these aspects at the award stage.36 
Nevertheless, in applying these criteria, the contracting author-
ity does not have unrestricted freedom of choice. The criteria need to 
be adequately specific and objectively quantifiable, and they need to be 
expressly mentioned in the contract notice or at least in tender docu-
31 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 42(1).
32 European Commission, ‘Buying Social! A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considera-
tions in Public Procurement’ (Publications Office of the European Union 2010) 29.
33 This also applies when the breaching of environmental law and social provisions consti-
tutes grave professional misconduct according to national legislation and when a tenderer 
has been found guilty of not complying with national rules regarding health and safety at 
work or prohibiting discrimination on any ground. Directive 2014/24/EU, art 57(4).
34 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 58(4).
35 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 67(2).
36 European Commission (n 32) 37.
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ments.37 Of course, they need to comply with the fundamental principles 
of EU law, especially with the principle of non-discrimination, from which 
derive other provisions, such as the freedom to provide services and the 
freedom of establishment.38
When the contracting authority wishes to achieve additional environ-
mental and social goals, separate from those expressed in the technical 
specifications or in the award criteria, it can use contract performance 
clauses. For example, these might include encouraging the employment 
of persons with disabilities, or the long-term unemployed, or giving pref-
erence to environmentally responsible delivery and disposal of the pack-
aging of goods.39 They specify how a contract must be carried out, which 
means that these demands must relate to the tasks necessary for the per-
formance of the contract.40 Companies must be aware of the obligations 
they will need to comply with, so contract performance clauses must be 
‘indicated in the call for competition or in the procurement documents’,41 
even though compliance with them should be monitored only during the 
execution of the contract.42 They always need to comply with national and 
EU law, and may never lead to the unequal treatment of tenderers. 
2.2 Possible discrimination in the social and environmental 
considerations 
Public procurement procedures through which governments and 
the public sector acquire needed goods, works and services can be used 
to promote certain policies.43 Boosting the employment of disadvantaged 
groups, promoting equality, and protecting the environment (or favouring 
domestic industry) while purchasing goods, works and services kill two 
birds with one stone. Still, while these practices are encouraged – which 
is visible now more than ever in the reform of the general and utilities 
directives as part of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy – it has to be ensured that 
the fundamental principles of EU law are respected. Therefore, the prin-
37 Case C513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki EU:C:2002:495, para 
66.
38 ibid, para 63.
39 European Commission (n 32) 44.
40 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 70.
41 ibid.
42 European Commission, ‘Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement’ (2nd 
edn, Publications Office of the European Union 2011) 46.
43 The attitude of the Commission and the Court towards implementing various policies 
in the procurement process has changed over time. After initial tolerance up to the mid 
1980s, a shift occurred, led by efforts to build a strong single market. In the mid 1990s, 
the use of environmentally and socially responsible policies in public procurement made 
a great comeback, receiving (not without some criticism) more and more encouragement 
lasting until today. Christopher McCrudden, ‘Buying Equality’ (2009) 8 European Anti-
Discrimination Law Review 21.
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ciple of non-discrimination, freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services are invoked multiple times in the legislation and in the 
judgments of the Court.44
Often in the form of indirect discrimination,45 contracting authorities 
may (intentionally or unintentionally) breach fundamental principles of 
EU law by imposing certain government policies. An example of how so-
cial and environmental considerations can lead to discrimination is well 
illustrated in two landmark cases: Beentjes and Concordia Bus. 
In the Beentjes case,46 a tender by Gebroeders Beentjes BV had 
been rejected by the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
because it appeared less acceptable than that of the next lowest bidder. 
The awarding authority stated that Beentjes lacked sufficient specific ex-
perience, and that it ‘did not seem to be in a position to employ long-term 
unemployed persons’.47
In proceedings before the Court, a few things were clarified. Namely, 
(a) what characterises a body to be classified as a part of the State; (b) the 
criterion of ‘specific experience’ is a legitimate aspect of technical ability 
and knowledge; (c) a contracting authority may apply the criterion of ‘the 
most acceptable tender’ if it reflects its right to discretion but may not 
involve arbitrary choice; and (d) social conditions may be taken into ac-
count if they do not have a discriminatory effect on tenderers from other 
MSs.48
While allowing the promotion of employment of those from ‘disad-
vantaged’ groups by applying the criterion of employing long-term un-
employed persons, the Court set some boundaries. It dismissed the ap-
plication of this condition as a selection criterion, as well as an award 
criterion, on the ground that it bore no relation to the contractors’ eco-
nomical/financial/technical suitability and ability.49 It enabled its use as 
a contract performance clause, as a means of attaining a goal not related 
to the specifications of a procured good, insofar as it is compatible with 
the provisions of EU law, in particular, the right of establishment and the 
44 See Cases C31/87 Beentjes v Netherlands EU:C:1988:422; Concordia (n 37); C3/88 Com-
mission v Italy (Data-processing contracts) EU:C:1989:606; C175/88 Biehl EU:C:1990:186; 
C330/91 Commerzbank EU:C:1993:303.
45 Direct discrimination occurs when one subject is treated less favourably than another 
in a comparable situation, and indirect discrimination occurs when an apparently neu-
tral provision, criterion or practice has the effect of disadvantaging a higher percentage of 
persons who share protected characteristics (ethnicity, sex, religion, etc). Paul Craig and 
Grainee de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 896.
46 Beentjes (n 44).
47 ibid, para 5.
48 ibid, paras 1–2.
49 ibid, para 28.
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right to provide services.50 The Court acknowledged that the obligation to 
employ long-term unemployed persons may infringe on the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality51 if it became obvious that such 
a condition favours tenderers from the MS concerned, or can be satis-
fied only by them.52 Following the Court’s reasoning, the current authors 
believe that these kinds of clauses in reality represent disguised, indirect 
discrimination of entrepreneurs who have an interest in responding to 
the public tender, and direct discrimination of workers. On the other 
hand, such discrimination could be justified by the lack of a common 
EU social policy and as any other discriminatory measure with a proper 
justification which is already recognised in EU law.
The authors believe that these kinds of clauses can lead to indirect 
discrimination of entrepreneurs who have an interest in responding to a 
public tender and direct discrimination of workers because, when trying 
to enhance employment, the contracting authorities often target what 
the authors of this paper call ‘disadvantaged’ groups. They include young 
people without work experience, the long-term unemployed, persons with 
disabilities, etc. The problem lies in their prior usually very low, or non-
existent, income.53
Residents who are usually nationals of the Member State in which 
the public procurement takes place have a considerable advantage in 
comparison to persons who do not have residence in that MS. An advan-
tage exists because residents have already situated themselves and man-
age to cover their costs of living on a longer and a regular basis. In con-
trast, the average long-term unemployed person who would need to move 
to another State or travel each day to work would have to assume these 
costs at short notice. The disadvantage is all the greater for non-residents 
of that MS if it is taken into account that there are more costs during 
the process of travelling or moving and adapting to a new residence. For 
instance, a long-term unemployed resident of a MS in which there is a 
public tender already has a place to stay and is able to pay the regular 
costs of living, while a long-term unemployed person from another MS 
would have to find residence and buy essential items.  
50 ibid, para 29.
51 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C-326/47 (TFEU), art 18.
52 Beentjes (n 44) para 30.
53 In Beentjes the problem arose because of the requirement that the ‘long term unem-
ployed should be registered with the local employment service’, but the question of indirect 
discrimination on grounds of nationality was posed, because the ‘long term unemployed 
from other countries were not likely to be registered in Holland’. The Court left the national 
court to decide if this was the case. See Beentjes (n 44). Since, those persons are long-term 
unemployed, it is in principle harder to expect them to have the financial assets to move to 
a different MS.
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Even if the company considered paying some of the expenses of its 
workers who would need to move or travel, this would raise its overall 
costs and would automatically mean that it would have to increase its 
price. Therefore, the company would be motivated either to employ resi-
dents of that MS or else risk losing the tender on account of the higher 
price it would have to offer. 
As a counterargument, it could be said that every person has the 
same living expenses regardless of their nationality or financial status 
at a certain time in one MS; therefore, there is no possibility of discrimi-
nation because the living costs are equal for residents and foreigners. 
Furthermore, the proponents of such a claim could argue that there is no 
difference between ‘regular’ workers and long-term unemployed workers 
because for both there is the same difficulty of travelling or moving to a 
different MS. The fact that there are greater costs for foreign companies 
and foreign workers is something that should not be regarded as discrim-
ination. Moreover, if a foreign company moves to a different MS, it will 
provide equal compensation of the additional expenses of working abroad 
for ‘regular’ workers and long-term unemployed workers.  
While this might be true, differences in prior life conditions cannot 
be neglected, especially in the situation where the groups in question 
have a limited budget. If the residents already have housing and can pay 
their regular living costs, they are in a better position to apply for the job 
than people living in other MSs. Therefore, such a requirement for em-
ploying long-term unemployed people is de facto discrimination because 
it provides for a larger number of people employed from the MS in which 
there is a public tender. If there were no such requirement, regular work-
ers from other MSs would have a better chance to be employed because 
they have on average more financial assets needed for moving or travel-
ling to another MS than the long-term unemployed.
However, this discussion can also be approached from a different 
standpoint. An argument can be made in the sense that since the EU 
does not have a common social policy and since it has quite limited com-
petences in this field, there is no reason why the condition of employing 
disadvantaged groups of people could not be limited to nationals of the 
MS concerned, as social goals are usually national ones. 
Ruth Nielsen holds that the Court in the Beentjes case observed only 
possible discriminatory effects on the tenderers from the other MSs, and 
thus indirect violation of article 56 TFEU on freedom to provide services, 
but comments that indirect violation of article 45 TFEU on free move-
ment of workers may also come into question.54 The authors welcome 
54 Ruth Nielsen, ‘Discrimination and Equality in Public Procurement’ <http://arbetsratt.ju-
ridicum.su.se/Filer/PDF/klaw46/discrimination.procurement.pdf> accessed 12 May 2015.
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this reasoning made within the boundaries of the facts of the Beentjes 
case.55 They claim that in general this may be true, but that in the above 
example there is only hindrance to the freedom to provide services. When 
there is a contract performance clause requiring the employment of long-
term unemployed people,56 the effect does not impede the participation of 
tenderers from other States, but favours the long-term unemployed from 
the State in question. The cost to fulfil a tender for a foreign economic op-
erator willing to employ residents will be the same as for a domestic eco-
nomic operator, so competitive conditions for them are the same. Those 
who are impacted and favoured are residents of the State where the pub-
lic procurement is conducted, because long-term unemployed persons 
from other MSs are less likely to move due to financial restraints. Thus, 
by indirect discrimination there is an infringement of article 56 TFEU on 
the freedom to provide services.
Another major concern for MSs and the EU is preserving the envi-
ronment. Reckless industrialisation has turned into a drive for sustain-
able development. Introducing Green Public Procurement (hereinafter: 
GPP) into national legislations is yet another way of putting environ-
mental concerns into government policies. It is defined by the European 
Commission’s Communication as ‘a process whereby public authorities 
seek to procure goods, services and works with a reduced environmental 
impact throughout their life-cycle’57 compared to those with the same 
primary function that would otherwise be procured. However, besides 
undeniable benefits, these kinds of practices have from the very start 
raised the question of discrimination as well. 
In 1997 the Purchasing Unit of the City of Helsinki called for tenders 
to operate the urban bus network within the city. After a dispute initi-
ated by an unsuccessful tenderer in the landmark case Concordia Bus,58 
the Court clarified what environmental requirements as one of the award 
criteria should look like in order to be compatible with the Treaties and 
public procurement directives and stressed the necessity of a ‘link to the 
subject-matter’.59
Concordia Bus made an application arguing that ‘the award of ad-
ditional points to a fleet with nitrogen oxide emissions and noise levels 
55 Namely, registration of the long-term unemployed with the local employment service.
56 No matter whether this is at a certain fixed percentage or in the form of awarding higher 
points to a tenderer that can offer more places for such persons.
57 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Public Pro-
curement for a Better Environment’ (2008) 400, 4.
58 Concordia (n 37).
59 For an example of the opposite situation, where the Court stated the absence of a link, 
see Case C448/01 EVN AG & Wienstrom GmbH v Austria EU:C:2003:651.
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below certain limits was unfair and discriminatory’.60 They found it dis-
criminatory that the highest standards for the required bus types could 
be reached only by one tenderer, HKL, which was in fact part of the trans-
port department of the city of Helsinki.61 
The Court first stated that combating the pollution effects, ie the 
externalities of the procured good, is linked to the subject matter.62 Sec-
ond, the contracting authority may pose ‘environmental’ award criteria, 
provided that they are linked to the subject matter, that they do not 
confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the authority, that they are 
expressly mentioned in the contract documents or the tender notice, and 
that they comply with the fundamental principles of EU law, in particular 
the principle of non-discrimination.63 And third, after establishing that all 
the requirements were complied with, it addressed specifically the last 
one, saying that ‘the fact that one of the criteria adopted by the contract-
ing entity (...) could be satisfied only by a small number of undertakings, 
one of which was an undertaking belonging to the contracting entity’,64 
does not constitute a breach of the principle of equal treatment.
The authors believe that the introduction of ‘green’ award criteria 
can be used as a tool for disguised discrimination, even though this 
seemingly complies with all the legal requirements. It can also be used 
for fixing the technical specifications or criteria, especially if there are 
complementary policies in the tax law and in the public procurement of 
one MS. 
In a situation like this, when the contracting authorities’ demands 
can be met only by a handful of operators (naturally, provided the compe-
tition is not artificially narrowed down),65 there is no question of discrimi-
nation, but just that the goods on the market have different character-
istics and qualities. The purchaser has every right to choose what suits 
him best, regardless of the number of tenderers. But when the goods of 
the required characteristics are available for each operator under differ-
ent conditions, they have the effect of increasing the costs for the ten-
derer and consequently of his offered price. For example, there could be 
a requirement that the tenderers need to have at least 25% of electrically 
powered vehicles in order to apply for the public tender. Some countries 
have various tax reductions, incentives, favourable credit terms and in-
terest rates or shorter write-off periods applicable to or offered to compa-
60 Concordia (n 37) para 27.
61 ibid.
62 ibid, paras 53–57.
63 ibid, para 64.
64 ibid, para 85.
65 ibid, para 85.
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nies buying environmentally friendly goods or pursuing environmentally 
conscious practices in general. While this is praiseworthy in itself, in 
public procurement processes it may create unjustifiable discrimination 
among tenderers from different MSs.
For example, if the purchase of electric vehicles is subject to favour-
able terms in one MS in comparison to the purchase of the same vehicles 
in another, a company in the former MS would have fewer expenses than 
one in the latter. The company that has more expenses will be forced to 
raise its offered price for the public tender in order to have a profitable 
business. If the use, ownership, service (or anything similar) of electric 
vehicles is required by a contracting authority, tenderers from different 
States would be in an unequal position with regard to their offered price 
in the public procurement procedure. Such a difference in the offered 
price would merely be the result of the different location of their head-
quarters. Unfortunately, the offered price of the submitted tenders may 
considerably affect the decision of the authorities. 
To explain this point, the authors make a hypothesis that there is 
a public tender in Bratislava in which the contracting authority inserts 
a green clause. Let us say that Slovakia has a tax reduction for environ-
mental investments. This would mean that every company based in Slo-
vakia would be in a better position than a company based in Austria. The 
cost of the needed investments would be smaller for Slovak undertakings 
than for their Austrian competitors. In the opinion of the authors, such 
a green requirement may be used as a tool for disguised discrimination 
which is even more problematic if the MS does not usually have similar 
environmental considerations in different aspects of its legal system. In 
such a case, the motivation of the contracting authority becomes dubi-
ous.
Proponents of this measure can argue that there cannot be disguised 
discrimination because such a situation is only the result of regulatory 
differences within the EU. Moreover, they argue that every MS has sov-
ereignty to determine its own tax system. In the Salzgitter case,66 the 
Court stated that due to the absence of Community-level harmonisation 
of the tax provisions of the MSs, such an approach was not meaningful, 
because it would in effect ‘compare different factual and legal situations 
arising from legislative and regulatory disparities between the MSs’.67 The 
authors believe that this argument does not hold since the problem in 
this hypothetical case lies not in the tax system itself, but in the design of 
the tender which a State may use in its favour or for disguised discrimi-
nation in order to favour one tenderer over another.
66 Case T308/00 Salzgitter v Commission EU:T:2004:199.
67 ibid, para 81.
221CYELP 12 [2016] 207-249
The authors stress that by (mis)using positive legislation in a pub-
lic procurement procedure by seemingly neutral requirements, the State 
can create a discriminatory effect. The problem lies not in the positive 
legislation or in the regulatory differences within the EU, but arises if 
a public tender is designed to favour one party. The authors’ message 
is that social and environmental clauses can be misused as disguised 
discrimination, so the inclusion of such clauses should be examined. If 
there is any doubt of foul play, all the facts of the case at hand need to be 
analysed to find out if the social and environmental clauses were used for 
their primary aim or if they were misused for disguised discrimination or 
to unduly favour one tenderer.68
2.3 Violation of public procurement rules
The preceding sections have shown how introducing environmental 
and social considerations can lead to restrictions of fundamental free-
doms as special expressions of the principle of non-discrimination. In the 
following parts, the authors show how contravening the basic provisions 
of EU law directly breaches public procurement rules, and how violating 
the latter leads to State aid incompatible with the internal market.
Paragraph 1 of the Recital to the 2014/24 Directive states that the 
award of public contracts has to comply with the principles of the TFEU, 
and that the awarding of public procurement contracts above certain 
thresholds has to comply with the provisions of the directives in order 
to ensure ‘that those principles are given practical effect and public pro-
curement is opened up to competition’.69 Article 18 of the 2014/24 Direc-
tive repeats the prohibition of discrimination.70 The situations presented 
in this paper constitute a considerable risk of unequal treatment, thus 
breaching both sets of rules. 
The authors’ aim is not to claim that environmental and social con-
cerns are an a priori breeding ground for States’ intentional or uninten-
tional violation of various rules applicable within the EU. Rather, the 
aim is to warn that all agendas present in government actions need to 
be scrutinised, regardless of their undoubtedly valuable core idea. Such 
scrutiny is necessary because sometimes there can be malicious motiva-
tion, but also sometimes MSs go down a road paved with good intentions, 
but could find themselves in a metaphorical hell.
68 Although a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, one of the relevant 
factors in deciding if social and environmental clauses are used for their primary aim or if 
they are misused for disguised discrimination or for unduly favouring one tenderer could 
be to assess if social and environmental clauses tend to favour tenderers or nationals from 
one MS instead of another.
69 Recital to Directive 2014/24/EU, para 1. 
70 ibid.
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2.4 The relationship between EU public procurement and State aid 
rules
An understanding of such a relationship is needed so that an analy-
sis can be made on whether there is a possible risk to State aid rules from 
the new public procurement directives under the influence of the ‘Europe 
2020’ project. It is also important to be aware of occasional interdepend-
ence between EU public procurement and State aid rules in order to be 
able to better scrutinise whether the new public procurement directives 
change the nature of the relationship between EU public procurement 
and State aid rules.
State aid rules are included primarily in the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the EU,71 but are also dealt with in different sources of soft law, 
such as guidelines, notices, etc. Public procurement rules, even though 
affected by the general provisions of the TFEU, such as those on non-
discrimination and transparency, are included in the Public and Utilities 
Procurement Directives. State aid rules see the State as an investor or 
creditor, and public procurement rules see it as a purchaser of goods, 
works or services.72 In both cases, however, the State needs to satisfy the 
‘market economy investor/creditor/purchaser principle’, ie it needs to 
behave as a private economic operator seeking just return and profit, or 
as a private consumer trying to strike the best possible price-quality bal-
ance. So, the logical conclusion would be that if a State does not hit the 
right balance (or the lowest price/highest quality extreme if it so decides) 
in its acquisitions, there is a risk that an unfair economic advantage will 
be given to the awarded provider of goods, works or services. In this situ-
ation, from the side of the State, we (may) have an infringement of public 
procurement rules, and, on the side of the State’s supplier, we (may) have 
an infringement of State aid rules.73 
An analysis of previous academic papers, the case law of the Court, 
and the Commission’s Reports on this matter shows how indeed a breach 
of procurement rules may lead to a breach of State aid rules.
2.4.1 The acid test
In the overview of the basics of State aid, it was stated that four 
cumulative conditions need to be satisfied for a certain measure to be 
characterised as State aid – intervention by the State or through State 
resources, advantage on a selective basis, distortion or a threat to dis-
71 Arts 107, 108 and 109 TFEU.
72 Andreas Bartosch, ‘The Relationship Between Public Procurement and State Aid Surveil-
lance: The Toughest Standard Applies?’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 551, 552.
73 Phedon Nicolaides and Sarah Schoenmaekers, ‘Public Procurement, Public Private Part-
nerships and State Aid Rules: A Symbiotic Relationship’ (2014) 9(1) European Procurement 
& Public Private Partnership Law Review 50, 50.
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tort competition, and likeliness to affect intra-EU trade. The definition 
of public procurement explains that the public sector purchases goods, 
works and services through a competition held on an EU internal market 
by awarding a public contract to one or several operators. When these 
‘definitions’ are combined, three out of four of them will usually be met 
in each public procurement. Since contracting authorities are State enti-
ties and bodies governed by public law dependent on a State, most public 
contracts will be imputable to the State and financed by the State’s re-
sources.74 By awarding a contract only to the winning tenderer or a group 
of them, the condition of selectivity will obviously be met.75 And leaning 
on that condition, the bigger the value of the contract, the greater is the 
chance of distorting competition and affecting trade between the MSs.76 
The condition that raises most doubts is the economic advantage that 
would not have been obtained under normal market conditions, ie the 
question of whether the State behaved and made its final choice accord-
ing to the Market Economy Investor (buyer) Principle.77
There are roughly three ways in which a State can fail to act as a pri-
vate consumer.78 When it pays more than the market price for a certain 
good, work or service,79 when it excludes suppliers (who may or may not 
be cheaper or better) from the procedure,80 and when it settles a contract 
by which it buys large quantities of something it does not really need.81
Taking all this into consideration, and based on the vast case law 
of the Court, the Commission stated in its decision in the London Under-
ground Public-Private Partnership case that:
74 Albert Sánchez-Graells, ‘Public Procurement and State Aid: Reopening the Debate?’ 
(2012) 21(6) Public Procurement Law Review.
75 See generally on this, Bartłomiej Kurcz and Dimitri Vallindas, ‘Can General Measures Be 
… Selective? Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of a State Aid Definition’ (2008) 45 CML 
Rev 159. 
76 Richard Burnley, ’Interstate Trade Revisited: The Jurisdictional Criterion for Articles 81 
and 82 EC’ (2002) 23(5) European Competition Law Review 217; for a detailed analysis of 
potential competition distortions generated by the public buyer, see Albert Sánchez-Graells, 
‘Distortions of Competition Generated by the Public (Power) Buyer: A Perceived Gap in EC 
Competition Law and Proposals to Bridge It’ (2009) The University of Oxford Centre for 
Competition Law and Policy Working Paper CCLP (L) 23, 3–17. The Court has often stated 
that even relatively little aid and the relatively small size of the undertaking do not exclude 
the possibility that intra-EU trade may be affected. See Case 142/87 Belgium v Commission 
EU:C:1990:125, para 43; Joined Cases C278/92, C279/92 and C280/92 Spain v Commis-
sion EU:C:1994:325, paras 40 - 42.
77 Case T14/96 BAI v Commission EU:T:1999:12, paras 71–76; Sánchez-Graells (n 74); 
Bartosch (n 72) 551.
78 Nicolaides and Schoenmaekers (n 73) 52.
79 Case C239/09 Seydaland Vereinigte Agrarbetriebe v BVVG Bodenverwertungs 
EU:C:2010:778, para 34; C290/07 Commission v Scott EU:C:2010:480,para 68.
80 Nicolaides and Schoenmaekers (n 73) 52.
81 ibid; BAI (n 77).
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After the observance of an open, transparent and non-discrim-
inatory procedure, it is, in principle, presumed that the level of 
any market sector support can be regarded as representing the 
market price for the execution of the project. This conclusion 
should lead to the assumption that, in principle, no State aid is 
involved.82
In its assessment of the famous Welsh Public Sector Network Scheme 
case, the Commission once again clarified a rebuttable presumption that 
no State aid incompatible with the TFEU provisions exists where the 
award of the contract is:
a) a pure procurement transaction;83 and 
b) the procurement procedure is compliant with the EU public 
procurement directives and suitable for achieving best value for 
money — inasmuch as no economic advantage which would go 
beyond normal market conditions will usually arise under these 
circumstances.84
To put it simply, determining whether the contract was awarded ac-
cording to the public procurement rules is an acid test85 to determine 
whether there is undue economic advantage, ie State aid granted. 
Still, not every situation has a public procurement – State aid paral-
lel. In certain cases, the affected subject may not be concerned with one 
of these rules. For example, the State aid case in which Ireland gave il-
legal tax benefits to Apple worth up to €13 billion was not concerned with 
public procurement rules. The case was mostly about State aid rules and 
tax rules.86
Examining the possible discriminatory impact of social clauses in a 
tender, the authors establish that indirect discrimination might breach 
article 56 TFEU on the freedom to provide services. But, from the per-
spective of the State aid rules, article 107(1) generally does not apply to 
benefits to individuals, ie natural persons.87 In a situation where the di-
82 Decision in the Case N264/2002 London Underground Public Private Partnerships, para 79.
83 On purchasing services from the market in order to satisfy a clearly defined public sector 
need, see Hughes (n 17) 5.
84 Assessment of the Commission of 30 May 2007, in Case N46/2007 Welsh Public Sec-
tor Network Scheme [C(2007) 2212 final]. For a short outline, see Nóra Tosics and Norbert 
Gaal, ‘Public Procurement and State Aid Control: The Issue of Economic Advantage’ (2007) 
European Commission, Competition Policy Newsletter 3, 16-17.
85 Sànchez-Graells (n 74) 10.
86 See more: European Commission, Press release, ‘State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Ben-
efits to Apple Worth up to €13 billion’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_
en.htm> accessed 9 October 2016.
87 See eg the Decision in Case N142/2005 Low Carbon Car Grant Programme; Bacon (n 18) 
28.
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rect beneficiaries are individuals, State aid may come into question only if 
that measure procures an indirect advantage to specific undertakings.88 
Favourising residents of a certain State does not benefit particular 
tenderers, because their access to competition is unchanged, as are their 
chances. From the perspective of the undertakings, the competition is 
not distorted, so there is no State aid in this situation either. When the 
public procurement procedure is compliant with the provisions of the 
Directive, there is a presumption that no State aid incompatible with the 
internal market is granted.89 In contrast, in the example of the hypotheti-
cal situation where environmental clauses were implemented, undertak-
ings were affected based on the location of their headquarters. Because of 
the discriminatory criterion in the design of the tender, such a procedure 
would not be compliant with the EU public procurement directives (or in 
the case of contracts below thresholds, it would not be compliant with 
EU principles), so there would be a risk of undue economic advantage, ie 
State aid given to a certain tenderer. Therefore, the social clauses in this 
hypothetical case pass the acid test, but the environmental clauses fail it.
A case-by-case approach, with the due diligence of everybody con-
cerned, is the only way governments, the Commission and the Court can 
secure compliance with all interconnected EU rules. As mentioned above, 
the acid test determines whether the contract was awarded according to 
public procurement rules and whether there was undue economic advan-
tage, ie State aid granted. The acid test was chosen as a tool of detecting 
potential State aid since it relies on objective and firm rules of public 
procurement.90
In the following part of this paper, the authors address the 2014 di-
rectives and the case law of the Court to establish whether something has 
changed in the relationship between EU public procurement and State 
aid rules. What are the risks of the 2014 directives if we know that they 
aim for a more flexible approach, increased use of negotiations in proce-
dures, and wider application of environmental and social considerations? 
Is the acid test still valid?
3 The new public procurement directives - a step forward for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth? 
As mentioned above, prior to the new public procurement directives, 
there was widely accepted consensus on the acid test with which it was 
88 Eg, Decision in Case N142/2005 Low Carbon Car Grant Programme; Bacon (n 18) 28.
89 Assessment of the Commission of 30 May 2007, in Case N46/2007 Welsh Public Sector 
Network Scheme [C(2007) 2212 final].
90 See Bartosch (n 72) 551
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possible to determine whether there was undue economic advantage, ie 
State aid granted. The logic was that if the contract was awarded ac-
cording to the public procurement rules, then there was (a rebuttable 
presumption that there was) no State aid.91 The point of interest in this 
section is to examine whether the test is still valid due to the reform (or 
lack of it) in public procurement rules as part of the ‘Europe 2020’ project 
and its impact on State aid rules. Therefore, the following main research 
aim of this paper will be analysed: Do the public procurement directives 
and the La Poste case create risks of infringing State aid rules.
To analyse the main research question, the authors discuss the fol-
lowing four topics:
1) When can the State participate in the market?
2) Links to the subject matter in public procurement procedures;
3) Negotiations in the public procurement procedure; and
4) Innovation partnership.
The authors take a critical approach to whether the project ‘Europe 
2020, a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, is a smart 
way for achieving growth, even if it attains greater sustainability and in-
clusiveness.
The authors explore precisely these issues because ‘Europe 2020’ 
was one of the main influences in the drafting of the new public procure-
ment directives. The EU’s willingness to use public procurement rules 
as a means of achieving its societal and ecological goals can be seen 
throughout the new public procurement directives. However, the authors 
are worried that the reform motivated by ‘Europe 2020’ did a disfavour to 
the public procurement system, in particular from the perspective of the 
provisions on the link to the subject matter, on negotiations in the public 
procurement procedure, and on innovation partnership.
But what can also be seen in the new directives is the lack of coher-
ence between State aid, its developing case law and public procurement 
rules. One of the main goals of ‘Europe 2020’ is growth. According to Tom 
Ginsburg, law matters for economic development.92 The authors believe 
that a coherent and a just legal system and the rule of law are vital for 
achieving growth. If the EU public procurement and State aid rules are 
not coherent, the EU will lose on its effectiveness in reaching its goals. 
Therefore, the authors also ask when the state can participate in the 
91 Sànchez-Graells (n 74) 10; Bartosch (n 72) 551.
92 Tom Ginsburg, ‘Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia’ 
(2000) 34 Law & Society Review 829 <http://home.uchicago.edu/~/tginsburg/pdf/ar-
ticles/DoesLawMatterForEconomicDevelop ment.pdf> accessed 22 April 2015.
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market to see if there is coherence between State aid rules and public 
procurement rules.
3.1 When can the state participate in the market? One question, 
multiple answers
In the EU, the public purchase of goods and services has been esti-
mated to account for 16% of GDP,93 which shows the importance of pub-
lic procurement rules to the EU economy. As previously mentioned, State 
aid rules are important because State aid may distort the dynamics of 
the competitive process.94 State aid may help perpetuate failed business 
models; it may reduce the incentive to compete; and it may create moral 
hazard by encouraging excessive risk taking.95
Thus, due to the importance of both EU public procurement and 
State aid rules, any new changes in public procurement rules motivated 
by ‘Europe 2020’ must respect the coherence of the EU legal system in 
general. It seems that the ‘Europe 2020’ project does not respect the 
coherence of EU law in an appropriate manner. More precisely, the au-
thors believe that there is a shortcoming in the implementation of ‘Eu-
rope 2020’ in the field of EU public procurement rules and in the latter’s 
relationship with EU State aid rules. This paper will go on to argue that 
unfortunately the EU has failed in this respect with the new public pro-
curement directives. This was especially highlighted after the La Poste 
case of 3 April 2014.
In this landmark case, it was established that there was an implied 
and unlimited loan guarantee from the French State in favour of the 
French post office (La Poste) because of La Poste’s status as a publicly 
owned establishment under French law and because La Poste could not 
be made subject to insolvency and bankruptcy procedures under ordi-
nary law.96 According to two leading credit rating agencies, Fitch and 
Standard & Poor’s, such a guarantee was a determining factor for the 
credit rating.97 They held that the market takes account of credit ratings 
in assessing the credit to be granted to a given undertaking.98 Therefore, 
a rating which is better on account of a guarantee is an advantage be-
cause a guarantee enables the borrower, for example, to enjoy a lower 
interest rate or provide a lower level of security.
93 For more, see European Commission, ‘Public Procurement’ <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/> accessed 24 March 2015.
94 Bacon (n 18) 9.
95 ibid.
96 See François-Charles Laprévote, Charlotte Emin and Florine Coupé, ‘The (French) Post-
man Rings Twice in Vain: The Court of Justice upholds of the GC’s Judgment in La Poste’ 
(2014) 4 ESTAL 735. 
97 Case T-154/10 France v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:452, para 106; 
98 ibid. 
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In order to determine whether a guarantee constitutes aid, it is nec-
essary to apply the ‘private investor test’,99 in other words to determine 
whether the recipient received an economic advantage that it would not 
have obtained under normal market conditions. So, for the case involving 
the French post office and its State guarantee, the question is whether 
the French post office would have received such a guarantee under nor-
mal market conditions from any other private creditor. An undertaking 
can also obtain an advantage by not paying premiums for the guaran-
tee because risk-carrying in the form of a guarantee should normally be 
remunerated by an appropriate premium under normal market condi-
tions.100
As a consequence of undue benefits, there is a selective advantage 
to that undertaking in comparison to its competitors, and so the com-
petition is distorted. There is also an effect on trade between MSs if the 
market was open for international competition, in accordance with the 
Mediaset case.101 All in all, such an implied and unlimited loan guarantee 
can constitute State aid that is incompatible with the internal market.
Therefore, every time there is such a guarantee from the State to an 
economic operator that forms part of the State or is under its ownership 
there is a high possibility that there is State aid. To summarise, the ques-
tion is when can the State (or an economic operator that forms part of the 
State or is under the ownership of the State) participate in the market 
under State aid rules? 
The State as an owner of a company can participate in the market 
only if the company is under such a legal form that the owner (in this 
case the State) is liable for the debts of its company only to the amount 
of its contributions and does not have to repay the debts of its company 
with its own property.
In the La Poste case, the European Commission requested the 
French authorities to make a conversion of the French post office to a 
public limited company in order to annul the implied and unlimited guar-
antee constituting State aid.102 Although the State was still the owner 
of the French post office after the conversion, there was no longer an 
implied and unlimited loan guarantee because the State could not be li-
able for the debts of La Poste because it was an owner of a public limited 
company. An owner of a company under such a legal form is liable for the 
99 Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:136, paras 21 and 22. 
100 Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid 
in the form of guarantees [2008] OJ C155, section 2.1.
101 Case C-403/10 P Mediaset v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:533, para 27. 
102 Case C-559/12 P French Republic v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2014:217, para 
11.
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debts of its company only to the amount of its contributions103 and does 
not have to repay the debts of its company with its own property. 
Unfortunately, enterprises under which the State is liable for the 
debts of those enterprises exist in many MSs, in particular in the utility 
and railway sectors.104 Although little time has passed from the La Poste 
judgment, part of the blame for some enterprises violating State aid rules 
should be attributed to the lack of coherence in the EU legislation. Due 
to the La Poste case, one needs to check if there is coherence between the 
current EU State aid and public procurement rules and consult the new 
public procurement directives to answer the question about when the 
State (or an economic operator that forms part of the State or is under 
the ownership of the State) can participate in the market, ie in a public 
procurement procedure. There will be a completely different answer from 
the one deriving from a similar question relating to State aid rules.
According to the public procurement rules, the legal form of the ten-
derer is not important, and gives a diametrically opposed answer to the 
question about when an entity of the State can participate in a market, or 
for a market105 in the form of a public procurement procedure.
In 17 April 2014, two weeks after the judgement in the La Poste, the 
new public procurement directives came into effect. According to those 
directives a ‘tenderer’ ‘means an economic operator that has submitted 
a tender’.106 An ‘economic operator’ ‘means any natural or legal person 
or public entity or group of such persons and/or entities, including any 
temporary association of undertakings, which offers the execution of 
works and/or a work, the supply of products or the provision of services 
on the market’.107 Such a broad definition goes far beyond the limitation 
placed by the State aid rules on the issue of when an economic operator 
which forms part of the State can participate in a market, that is, in a 
public procurement procedure. This difference is most noticeable in the 
preamble to both of the new public procurement directives:
103 Jakša Barbić, Pravo društava, Društva kapitala, Svezak I. - Dioničko društvo; (6th edn, 
Organizator 2013) 15.
104 Valerie Guigue Koeppen, ‘La Poste: Implied Unlimited State Guarantees Under the Loop 
of State Aid Law’ (2014) 5 JECLP 548.
105 Competition in a market is a situation in which in an already established market, a 
certain number of competitors are competing between each other. While competition for 
a market is competition between a certain number of competitors which are competing 
between each other to win exclusive or partially exclusive access to a certain market. For 
example, if a public tender offers exclusive access to the market of collection of waste, then 
the competitors which apply for the public tender are competing for that market.
106 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 2(10).
107 ibid, art 2(11).
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It should be clarified that the notion of ‘economic operators’ 
should be interpreted in a broad manner so as to include any 
persons and/or entities which offer the execution of works, the 
supply of products or the provision of services on the market, 
irrespective of the legal form under which they have chosen to 
operate.108 Thus, firms, branches, subsidiaries, partnerships, co-
operative societies, limited companies, universities, public or pri-
vate, and other forms of entities than natural persons should all 
fall within the notion of economic operator, whether or not they 
are ‘legal persons’ in all circumstances.109
Since, according to the public procurement rules the legal form of 
the tenderer is not important, this gives a diametrically opposed answer 
to the question about when an entity of the State can participate in a 
market or for a market in the form of a public procurement procedure. To 
make things more interesting, the Financial Transparency Directive gives 
a third answer to the same question.
According to the Financial Transparency Directive, the prerequisite 
for a public undertaking to participate in the market is to have a separate 
account from the public authority.110 Although such a rule is not contra-
dictory to the public procurement rules, it can be misleading in the con-
text of the La Poste case because the mere fact that a public undertak-
ing has a separate account does not preclude the possibility of potential 
State aid. For instance, if the French post office in the La Poste case had a 
separate account from the public authority, it would still constitute State 
aid. Below, to summarise, the paper presents the three different answers 
to the question about when an economic operator which forms part of the 
State or is owned by the State can participate in a market or for a market 
in the context of a public procurement procedure and provides a possible 
solution to the problem.
a) State aid rules: when it is in a legal form in which the owner of the 
company is not liable with its property for the company’s debts;
b) Public procurement rules: it can participate irrespective of the 
legal form;
108 Para 17 of the Recital to Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (Text with EEA 
relevance) [2014] OJ L 94/243.
109 Recital to Directive 2014/24/EU, para 14.
110 Art 1(2) of the Financial Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Par-
liament and the Council of 15 December [2004] OJ L390/38, amended by the Financial 
Transparency Directive 2013/50/EC of the European Parliament and the Council [2013] 
OJ L294/13.
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c) Financial Transparency Directive: when it has a separate account 
from the public authority.
The authors suggest that the public procurement rules and the Fi-
nancial Transparency Directive should be changed at the first opportuni-
ty so that both contain the prerequisite that an economic operator which 
forms part of the State or is owned by the State should make a conversion 
to a legal form in which the owner of the company is not liable with its 
property for the company’s debts in order to participate in the market or 
for the market.111 Although, the internal legal systems vary from MS to 
MS, each MS has a certain type of company under which the owner of the 
company is not liable with its property for the company’s debts.112 
Implementing these changes to the public procurement rules will 
help avoid State aid in the form of an implied and unlimited loan guar-
antee for all public undertakings that are participating in the public pro-
curement procedure. It would also promote the basic principle of equal 
treatment and non-discrimination because undertakings linked to the 
State would not have a selective advantage from the very start of the ten-
der process.
Likewise, if the Financial Transparency Directive were changed in 
this manner, it could achieve two things: a) it would be more coherent 
with the State aid rules; b) the public undertakings would also have sepa-
rate accounts, since every undertaking that is a public limited company 
or a limited liability company or something similar has a separate ac-
count from the public authority. In this way, the Financial Transparency 
Directive would not lose its objectives, and the authors’ suggestion would 
not have an effect on the area covered by the Financial Transparency Di-
rective while it would promote adherence to State aid rules.
The authors believe that not only does it make sense to unify these 
rules, but also that this is in accordance with the basic principle of the 
rule of law and the principle of hierarchy of norms. Since the State aid 
rules are part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it 
is part of EU primary law, which is the supreme source of law of the Eu-
ropean Union, that is, it prevails over all other sources of law. It is at the 
apex of the European legal order.113 Given that the public procurement 
directives and the financial transparency directives are part of second-
111 Jakša Barbić, Pravo društava, Opći dio (3rd edn, Organizator 2008) 297.
112 W Zöllner, Gläubigerschutz durch Gesellschafterhaftung bei der GmbH (FS für Horst Kon-
zen 2006) 999; Jakša Barbić, Pravo društava, Društva kapitala, Svezak I. - Dioničko društvo; 
(6th edn, Organizator 2013) 15.
113 ‘Primary law’ <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decision-
making_process/l14530_en.htm> accessed 10 August 2015.
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ary law, they should be in accordance with the primary source of law, in 
this case with State aid rules. One could say that the strategy for ‘smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth’ does not appear to be so smart in this 
particular case.
3.2 The link to the subject matter in public procurement procedures 
The EU public procurement directives are not concerned directly 
with what contracting authorities buy, but how they buy needed goods, 
works and services.114 They are concerned with defining the process – 
which procedures can be used, what will the timeframe be for certain 
stages, what criteria can be set to define contracting authorities’ prefer-
ences, etc. For this reason, the implementation of environmental and 
social considerations in public purchases is subject to certain rules. In 
this subsection, the development of the inclusion of non-economic cri-
teria in public procurements is outlined. Further, the obligation to have 
a stable link to the subject matter for such criteria is also examined. In 
the conclusion, there is a critical take on the aim of the new directives to 
simultaneously encourage environmental and social policies in procure-
ment procedures and to limit the role of the contracting authorities as 
market regulators. 
In 1988, in the Beentjes case, the Court for the first time allowed 
public purchasers to acquire supplies and services with a higher societal 
value, upholding the requirement to employ long-term unemployed per-
sons as one of the contract performance clauses.115 In 2000, 2002 and 
2003, in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais and EVN and Wienstrom cases, the Court 
clarified its approach to environmental non-economic award criteria.116 
These criteria cannot confer unrestricted freedom of choice on the con-
tracting authority, they need to be expressly mentioned in the contract 
documents or the tender notice, they must comply with the fundamental 
principles of EU law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination, 
114 Even though, in the Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy 
published in 2011, there was a proposal in support of the ‘Europe 2020’ policy objectives to 
‘impose on contracting authorities obligations on “what to buy”’. For example, by imposing 
mandatory requirements in regard of characteristics (eg a minimum level of recycling) or by 
setting targets (eg 70% of public purchases must be environmentally friendly). In the replies 
to the Green Paper, business, public authorities and MSs strongly opposed it, warning that 
such an obligation could lead to discrimination and restrict competition in procurement 
markets. The result would be fewer bidders and higher prices. Groups forming civil society 
were the only ones who supported this idea to a certain extent. Green Paper on the Mod-
ernisation of EU Public Procurement Policy: Towards a More Efficient European Procure-
ment Market COM(2011) 41–42; ibid, Synthesis of Replies 15; cf Nicolas de Sadeleer, EU 
Environmental Law and the Internal Market (OUP 2014).
115 Case C31/87 Beentjes v Netherlands EU:C:1988:422.
116 Cases C225/98 Commission v France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) EU:C:2000:494; Concordia (n 
37); C448/01 EVN AG & Wienstrom GmbH v Austria EU:C:2003:651. 
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and they must be linked to the subject matter.117 In the judgment of 2012 
in the Max Havelaar case, the use of labels to certify organic and/or fair 
trade production as an award criterion was accepted.118 
The tendency over time was to allow ever broader use of environmen-
tal and social considerations. The Court acknowledged that including 
non-economic criteria in purchases of goods, works and services would 
not undermine the basic aim of acquiring value for money. At the same 
time, MSs gained a valuable tool through which they could pass vari-
ous horizontal policies and set an example of an environmentally and 
socially responsible buyer. Through these cases, the Court established a 
requirement that each non-economic criterion the contracting authority 
sets must be linked to the subject matter. For example, a requirement to 
reduce noise and pollution coming from the provision of urban bus trans-
port in Concordia Bus was found to be linked to the subject matter.119 But 
rewarding the highest number of points for a tenderer able to supply the 
highest amount of renewable energy to consumers in excess of what was 
the contracting authority’s consumption in the EVN and Wienstrom case 
was considered to be without a link to the subject matter.120 The pro-
cured good was electricity for the contracting authority’s consumption, 
so a requirement for it to be from renewable sources can relate only to the 
amount needed for its consumption, but the terms of electricity supply 
from the same supplier for other consumers is outside the scope of the 
subject matter of the contract.
The judge-made requirement for a link to the subject matter was 
integrated into the 2004 directives, though it was not worded in the 
same way for each stage of the procurement procedure. Non-economical 
parameters in technical specifications had to be ‘sufficiently precise to 
allow tenderers to determine the subject matter of the contract and to 
allow contracting authorities to award the contract’.121 Suitability crite-
ria122 related to economic and financial ability or technical and profes-
sional ability had to be ‘related and proportionate to the subject matter 
of the contract’.123 A link to the subject matter is explicitly required for 
117 Concordia (n 37) para 64.
118 Case C368/10 Commission v Netherlands (Max Haavelaar) EU:C:2012:284.
119 Concordia (n 37) para 65.
120 Case C448/01 EVN AG & Wienstrom GmbH v Austria EU:C:2003:651, paras 67-68.
121 In art 23 of the 2004 Directive, only environmental characteristics are mentioned, but 
the Court through its case law interpreted it generally to refer to non-economic character-
istics. Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ l134/114 (Directive 2004/18/EC) 
art 23(3)(b).
122 Corresponds to the selection criteria in the 2014 directives.
123 Directive 2004/18/EC, art 44(2).
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all award criteria.124 And, finally, for the conditions for the performance 
of contracts, it states that ‘[c]ontracting authorities may lay down special 
conditions relating to the performance of a contract, provided that these 
are compatible with Community Law (...)’.125
In the Green Paper that preceded the modernisation of the public 
procurement directives in 2014, the Commission discussed loosening 
or even abandoning the link to the subject matter. It stated that such 
a move would be in favour of pursuing ‘Europe 2020’ policy objectives 
through public procurement, and would allow ‘contracting authorities 
to influence the behaviour of undertakings regardless of the product or 
service purchased’.126 However, the Commission warned that the link 
guarantees purchases at the best price, so removing the focus from the 
subject matter of the contract might entail risks with regard to consist-
ency with State aid rules.127
The final result of public consultations was, the authors believe, 
twofold. While formally strengthening the link to the subject matter, by 
advocating the application of the criteria related to any stage of the life 
cycle128 ‘from extraction of raw materials for the product to the stage of 
disposal of the product’,129 the directives have allowed the widest use of 
environmental and social criteria so far. 
The directives provide that technical specifications: 
may also refer to the specific process or method of production 
(...) or to a specific process for another stage of its life-cycle even 
where such factors do not form part of their material substance 
provided that they are linked to the subject-matter of the con-
tract and proportionate to its value and its objectives’.130 
The wording for the selection criteria remained unchanged, demand-
ing that all requirements are ‘related and proportionate to the subject-
matter of the contract’.131 The same wording stayed for the award criteria 
as well, requiring a ‘link to the subject-matter of the public contract in 
124 ibid, art 53(1)(a).
125 ibid, art 26.
126 Green Paper (n 114) 39.
127 ibid
128 ‘Life cycle’ means all consecutive and/or interlinked stages, including research and de-
velopment to be carried out, production, trading and its conditions, transport, use and 
maintenance, throughout the existence of the product or the works or the provision of the 
service, from raw material acquisition or generation of resources to disposal, clearance and 
end of service or utilisation’. Directive 2014/24/EU, art 1.
129 Recital to Directive 2014/24/EU, para 97.
130 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 42(1).
131 ibid, art 58(1). 
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question’.132 As regards contract performance clauses, to the existing ‘re-
lation to the performance of the contract’, the new directives added an 
explicit requirement for a link to the subject matter.133
At the same time, the directives went further in defining what would 
be considered the link to the subject matter. In line with the recent devel-
opment of the relevant case law of the Court,134 tending towards broader 
interpretation of the scope of the subject matter, the 2014/24 Directive 
held that 
contracting authorities should be allowed to use award criteria 
or contract performance conditions relating to the works, sup-
plies or services to be provided under the public contract in any 
respect and at any stage of their life-cycles from extraction of raw 
materials for the product to the stage of disposal of the product 
(...) even where such factors do not form part of their material 
substance.135 
An extended view on the scope of the subject matter was also ex-
pressed in article 42 on technical specifications, again with reference to 
the various stages of the life cycle.136 The result of such a view is that 
anything that is included in the life cycle would thus be considered linked 
to the subject matter.137 
In reaction to the new directives which opted for continued use of 
the link to the subject matter, Abbey Semple believes that under the 
2014 directives there is a radical extension of the link to the subject-
matter requirement.138 She claims that the Green Paper overstated the 
importance of the link to the subject matter under the 2004 directives, 
describing this as ‘a fundamental condition that has to be taken into 
account when introducing into the public procurement process any con-
siderations that relate to other policies’ which are applied ‘throughout 
132 ibid, art 67(2).
133 ibid, art 70.
134 In 2012 the Court upheld the view of a broad link to the subject matter when it held in 
Max Havelaar that ‘to require that the tea and coffee to be supplied must come from small 
scale producers in developing countries, subject to trading conditions favourable to them’ 
fell within the social considerations permissible under art 26 of the 2004 Directive. See 
Case C368/10 Commission v Netherlands (Max Havelaar) EU:C:2012:284.
135 Recital to Directive 2014/24/EU, para 97 (emphasis added).
136 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 42(1).
137 Marc Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract 
in Green and Social Procurement’ (2013) EPPPL 1, 17.
138 Abby Semple, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter: A Glass Ceiling for Sustainable Public 
Contracts?’ (2014) 12, available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2565051> accessed 26 September 2015.
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the successive stages of the procurement process’.139 As outlined above, 
the subject-matter link explicitly appeared only in relation to the award 
criteria under the 2004 directives, and had only been referred to by the 
Court in this context.140 In essence, Semple claims that broader use of 
the link to the subject matter would narrow the application of social and 
environmental considerations.
The authors do not agree with such an opinion. On the contrary, 
they believe that in spite of the fact that the link has been nominally 
strengthened by its explicit mention in more of the provisions of the di-
rective, its scope of application has in fact been broadened by introducing 
the notion of life cycle. The clear statement that non-economic criteria 
can relate to any stage of the life cycle extended what is considered to be 
the scope of the subject matter. Thus, as a consequence of the new direc-
tives, social and environmental considerations can be used more often in 
a public tender. 
For example, the contracting authorities can now require that every-
one from the original producer, intermediate supplier to the contracting 
authorities’ supplier of certain goods behave in accordance with organic 
and fair trade requirements. 
In conclusion, the consequence of the new public procurement di-
rectives’ broad view on the link to the subject matter is that anything that 
is included in the life cycle would thus be considered linked to the subject 
matter.141 The authors believe that the European Union has taken the 
Niccolò Machiavelli logic which says that ‘the goal justifies the means’.142 
Although, such an approach might be useful for the ‘Europe 2020’ goals, 
unfortunately such logic is flawed in this case because: a) the means are 
not justified, and b) the goal could be reached by other less damaging 
means. 
On the one hand, as this paper has already analysed in part 3, social 
and environmental considerations in a public tender can be a double-
edged sword. Such additional requirements could be misused in order 
to pick winners and losers of the public procurement procedure. The 
EU’s choice of broadening the scope of the link to the subject matter and 
ipso facto widening the scope of social and environmental considerations 
which can be used in the public tender creates even more risk of dis-
crimination than in the case of a narrower scope. Consequently, such a 
change in the public procurement rules leads to more risk of favouritism, 
distortion of competition and violation of State aid rules. The authors do 
139 ibid.
140 ibid.
141 Martens and de Margerie (n 137) 17.
142 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (first published 1515, Bantam Dell 1996) 122.
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not agree with Semple who advocates a looser link to the subject mat-
ter.143 When the scope of the subject matter of the contract is debated, 
potential gains for sustainable development and social justice need to be 
weighed against the potential losses for other policies. Broader interpre-
tation of the scope of the link to the subject matter can trigger misuse 
of non-economic requirements, which would infringe the rules of public 
procurement. Once they have been violated, the risk of State aid granted 
is plausible. To avoid this, the authors believe that the interpretation of 
the link to the subject matter needs to be narrower.
On the other hand, more effective tools for combating climate change 
and social injustice could be a larger amount of EU funds reserved for 
environment friendly and socially conscious projects, or additional EU 
legislation aimed at fulfilling the goals of ‘Europe 2020’ in both the public 
and the private sector. Despite the fact that the use of a larger amount 
of EU funds would bring more costs for the EU instead of relying on the 
MSs to spend their money on public procurement, it is the authors’ belief 
that the problems could be tackled directly, rather than using defective 
solutions which compromise public procurement and State aid rules and 
the benefits which derive from compliance with those rules. Although the 
manifestation of the ‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth’ in this particular case might lead to more sustainability 
and inclusiveness, there are risks that public procurement and State aid 
rules will be compromised.
3.3 Negotiations in the public procurement procedure
The aim of public procurement rules is to secure fair competition 
among economic operators on the one hand, and the best use of taxpay-
ers’ money in public purchases on the other. For this reason, the un-
derlying principle of public procurement is to treat economic operators 
equally and without discrimination, while acting in a transparent and 
proportionate manner.144 To guarantee a level European playing field, the 
award of public contracts below thresholds has to comply with the prin-
ciples of the TFEU, and, for public contracts above thresholds, a national 
procedure compliant with the provisions of the procurement directives 
has to be applied.145
Under the 2004/18 and 2004/17 Procurement Directives,146 con-
tracting authorities had open and restricted procedures which bore no 
143 Semple (n 138).
144 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 18(1).  
145 Recital to Directive 2014/24/EU, para 1.
146 Directive 2004/18/EC, Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in 
the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ 134/1.
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possibility of negotiations.147 Different variations of restricted procedures 
included negotiations, but were applicable only in a limited number of 
situations, where there could be a negotiated procedure with or without 
a prior publication of a contract notice.148 Through the procedure of a 
design contest, the jury selected a plan or a design.149 The new proce-
dures introduced in the 2004 directives were a competitive dialogue,150 a 
dynamic purchasing system151 and an electronic auction.152
In 2010 in the Single Market Act,153 the European Commission an-
nounced its plan to modernise public procurement rules as part of the 
‘Europe 2020’ strategy. The goal was to simplify the award of contracts 
and make the procedure more flexible to create an effective Europe-wide 
procurement market, which would at the same time support other poli-
cies and save billions of taxpayers’ money.154 An additional goal was to 
increase cross-border procurement, which in 2009 accounted for only 
around 1.5% of all public contracts awarded.155
As part of the wide consultations that followed, in 2011 the Com-
mission published the ‘Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public 
procurement policy’156 (hereinafter: Green Paper) in which it detected the 
need for more flexibility in procurement procedures and broader use of 
negotiations in the procedures. In response to the questions posed in the 
Green Paper, the majority of interested stakeholders, namely businesses, 
MSs, public authorities and even legal experts, supported the suggestion 
to allow more negotiation or to generalise the use of the negotiated proce-
147 ibid, art 28.
148 ibid, arts 30–31.
149 ibid, arts 66–74.
150 ibid, arts 28–29.
151 A two-stage process for whose setting up and subsequent award of contracts contract-
ing authorities use solely electronic means. Following the rules of the open procedure, all 
economic operators who satisfy the selection criteria and are not subject to some of the ex-
clusion grounds must be admitted to the dynamic purchasing system. They do not need to 
demonstrate suitability and capability each time they wish to compete for a public contract. 
In the second stage, authorities invite economic operators to bid for the specific contract. 
Directive 2004/18/EC, art 33.
152 After an initial full evaluation of the tenders, an electronic device for the presentation of 
new prices, revised downwards, and/or new values concerning certain elements of tenders, 
is used to rank tenders using automatic evaluation methods. Consequently, contracts hav-
ing intellectual performances as their subject matter may not be the object of electronic 
auctions.  Directive 2004/18/EC, art 54.
153 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Towards a Single Mar-
ket Act for a highly competitive social market economy: 50 proposals for improving our 
work, business and exchanges with one another’ COM (2010).
154 ibid 15.
155 ibid.
156 Green Paper, Synthesis of replies (n 114) 10.
239CYELP 12 [2016] 207-249
dure with prior publication of a contract notice.157 They argued that with 
an increased margin for negotiation, the contracting authorities could 
procure goods, works and services that were more fitting to their actual 
needs. The only stakeholders opposing this proposition were civil society 
and, to a certain extent, SME representatives.158
However, from the initial advocacy in the Green Paper for more ne-
gotiation, the Commission acknowledged that negotiated procedures in-
crease the risk of favouritism and give rise to overly subjective decisions 
due to the greater discretion enjoyed by contracting authorities.159 The 
Commission explicitly stated that negotiated procedures would make it 
harder to detect possible grants of State aid. A clear majority of stake-
holders stated that they were indeed aware of the possible negative con-
sequences in terms of abuse, transparency and discrimination.160 
As mentioned above, the belief that a procurement procedure com-
pliant with the directives ruled out the possibility of undue economic 
advantage was based on the ‘rigidity’ of public procurement rules. The 
behaviour of the contracting authority was strictly monitored, so the po-
tential to favour certain economic operators, especially domestic ones, 
was minimised. With the new directives, with the aim of improving the 
outcomes of the procurement procedures, the discretion enjoyed by 
the contracting authorities grew considerably. General availability and 
grounds for the use of negotiated procedures widened, and, in the opin-
ion of the authors, so did the risk of granting State aid incompatible with 
the internal market.
The new directive kept the basic open and restricted procedures, 
but made it easier for the contracting authorities to choose from the two 
options. Stating that ‘MSs shall provide that contracting authorities may 
apply open or restricted procedures’,161 the directive removed the previ-
ous right of MSs to decline to use one of these procedures in their na-
tional systems, or to place restrictions when both of these procedures 
were available, for example restricting use for certain procuring entities 
or for certain types of procurement.162 In the authors’ view, by doing this, 
the new directive made a somewhat dubious move. While trying to as-
sure that every contractor can select the procedure that suits it best, the 
new directive deprived MSs of the right to intervene in the process. Even 
if an MS believes that for certain authorities, sectors or types of public 




161 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 26(2)
162 Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement: Regulation in the EU and 
UK (3rd edn, vol 1, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) para 7 – 07.
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contract it would be more beneficial to set the conduct of an open proce-
dure as the general rule in order to enhance transparency, objectivity and 
public support, it is now not allowed to do so.163
There are three more competitive procedures provided in the 2014 
directives, two of which already existed before: competitive dialogue and 
competitive procedure with negotiations (previously named negotiated pro-
cedure with a notice), and innovation partnership as the third one, intend-
ed for the development and purchase of innovative goods, works and ser-
vices. The risks of the latter will be discussed in the following subsection.
The main difference of these procedures in contrast to the restricted 
procedures is that after a contracting authority invites a certain number 
of economic operators that request to participate, their submitted ten-
ders are subject to subsequent negotiations.164 In the case of competi-
tive dialogue, after being invited, the tenderers automatically enter into 
dialogue with the authorities to identify the means best suited to their 
needs.165 These procedures, due to the higher discretionary margin of the 
contracting authorities, were available only on limited grounds.
As a result of public consultations, the use of negotiated procedures 
was allowed only in certain situations. But both for competitive dialogue 
and a competitive procedure with negotiations, two similar (and rather 
important) changes occurred. 
First, as with the open and restricted procedure, the new directive 
stated that ‘MSs shall provide that contracting authorities may apply (...) 
in the following situations’,166 with the consequence that governments 
cannot decline to incorporate these procedures in their national systems, 
nor can they restrict their use at all in the situations listed in article 
26.167 By limiting MSs’ discretion to regulate, this provision increases the 
discretion of the contracting authorities. Whether or not this is at the cost 
of transparency and non-discrimination remains to be seen.168
Second, the permitted grounds for the use of these procedures wid-
ened, and, in addition, became the same for both competitive dialogue 
and a competitive procedure with negotiations.169 Paragraph 42 of the 
163 In line with this reasoning, see the discussion in Arrowsmith (n 162) paras 7 – 07, 8 – 09, 
9 – 19.
164 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 29.
165 ibid, art 30.
166 ibid, art 26(4).
167 Arrowsmith (n 162) paras 8 – 09, 9 – 19.
168 In line with this reasoning, see the discussion in Arrowsmith (n 162) paras 7 – 07, 8 – 09, 
9 – 19.
169 For a comparison, see articles 29 and 30 of Directive 2004/18/EC and article 26(4) of 
Directive 2014/24/EU.
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Recital to the 2014 Directive suggests that, based on previous experi-
ence, greater use of these procedures is also likely to increase participa-
tion in cross-border tenders.170 Arrowsmith claimed that this is a rather 
questionable assumption, because a higher rate of cross-border tenders 
is probably the result of the nature of the procurement (often high-value 
and complex) and not the nature of the procedure used.171 The authors 
agree, claiming that the Commission in its reasoning mixed up cause and 
effect. The value of the awarded contract is a cause and the nature of the 
procedure is an effect. 
The authors believe that with the policy shift towards a more flexible 
choice of procedures and a wider use of negotiated procedures, the viabil-
ity of the ‘public procurement – State aid’ test comes into question. The 
presumption from the case of the Welsh Public Sector Network Scheme 
that the conduct of a procurement procedure compliant with the EU pub-
lic procurement directives and suitable for achieving the best value for 
money means that no State aid was granted during the process172 may 
not hold such firm support as it did prior to the new directives.173 An 
increased scope for negotiations that increases the discretion enjoyed 
by the contracting authorities bears the risk of public contracts being 
awarded on an overly subjective criterion, which in turn would make it 
harder to prove that the resulting contract did not involve State aid.174
Two goals were set in front of the modernisation of public procure-
ment rules as part of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, as a market-based in-
strument which would be used to achieve its objectives:175 to ensure the 
most efficient use of public funds and to keep procurement markets open 
EU-wide.176 Applying the acid test was a way of checking whether undue 
economic advantage, which in its core is diametrically opposed to these 
goals, was granted in the process. By restricting the discretion of MSs in 
regulating national procurement procedures on the one hand, and widen-
ing the scope of negotiations for contracting authorities on the other, the 
new directives brought the consensus concerning this test into question.
In a certain number of cases, procurement procedures will be com-
pliant with the public procurement directives, but will this ensure the 
170 Recital to Directive 2014/24/EU, para 42. This is a finding of the evaluation report that 
led to the 2014 directives. See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, 
‘Evaluation Report: Impact and Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation’ SEC 
(2011) 853 final.
171 See Arrowsmith (n 162) paras 8–18.
172 ibid.
173 For a similar discussion on this subject, see Sànchez-Graells (n 74)
174 Green Paper (n 114) 15;  Sànchez-Graells (n 74) 12
175 Green Paper (n 114) 3.
176 ibid.
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best value for money and will it rule out the possibility of State aid? The 
authors believe that it is debatable whether best value for money will be 
achieved. Moreover, they are convinced that compliance with the new 
public procurement directives cannot rule out the possibility of State aid. 
Although it was also not ruled out entirely before the new directives, it 
seems that it is even truer now after the enactment of the new directives 
that they cannot rule out the possibility of State aid. If the importance of 
State aid rules is taken into account, as well as the benefits of complying 
with them, the authors believe that in this particular case the new public 
procurement directives are a step back for growth in the ‘Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’. 
3.4 Innovation partnership 
The 2014 directives introduced a new award procedure, innovation 
partnership. It is designed for situations in which the contracting au-
thority identifies the need for an innovative product, service or works, 
because its needs ‘cannot be met by purchasing products, services or 
works already available on the market’.177 It comprises development of 
an innovative good, service or work as a first phase, and the subsequent 
purchase of the result as a second.178 In the wording of article 26, this 
procedure must also be available to contracting authorities, and cannot 
be subject to any restrictions from the MSs.179 Any interested economic 
operator may submit a request to participate, but only those invited by 
the contracting authority may participate in the procedure.180 Contract-
ing authorities negotiate the initial and all subsequent tenders submitted 
by the participants, except for the final tender, but ‘[t]he minimum re-
quirements and the award criteria shall not be subject to negotiations’.181 
Negotiations can be conducted in successive stages in order to gradually 
reduce the number of tenders to be negotiated.182
It is obvious that this kind of restricted, negotiated procedure, with 
the possibility of reducing the number of candidates and the vague sub-
ject matter of the contract, bears the risk of anti-competitive, subjective 
and discriminatory behaviour. It has indeed raised a number of issues, 
such as those concerned with grounds, structure, intellectual property 
rights (hereinafter: IPR), confidentiality and State aid.183 
177 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 31(1).
178 ibid, art 31(2).
179 ibid, art 26(3).
180 ibid, art 31(1). 
181 ibid, art 31(3). 
182 ibid, art 31(5). 
183 Pedro Telles, ‘Public Contracts Regulations 2015 - Regulation 31’ <http://www.telles.
eu/blog/2015/4/9/public-contracts-regulations-2015-regulation-31> accessed 23 April 
2015. 
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Sànchez-Graells expressed doubts about the ability of contracting 
authorities to conclude that there is a ‘need for an innovative product, 
service or works that cannot be met by purchasing products, services or 
works already available on the market’.184 It is unlikely that the contract-
ing authorities themselves would be able to identify something that has 
not been previously identified by the market, or that the adaptation of 
existing products or services is not possible.185
An improper assessment of the situation by the contracting author-
ity is then followed by a highly discretionary procedure rather than other 
‘traditional’ competitive public procurement procedures. Such a situation 
would be compliant with the directives, but the authors believe it would 
undeniably create unnecessary risks and costs for both contracting au-
thorities and economic operators. As proposed in subsection 3.2 (on the 
link to the subject matter), additional EU funds reserved for fulfilling the 
goals of ‘Europe 2020’ or EU legislation aimed directly at the targeted ob-
jectives of ‘Europe 2020’, at least in this particular case, would be more 
useful than using defective solutions. 
Once the innovation partnership is decided on, there are a few ways 
in which competition can be disrupted. Pedro Telles calls them ‘pieces of 
the Trojan horse puzzle’.186
One of the ways is the right of the contracting authority to ‘decide to 
set up the innovation partnership with one partner or with several part-
ners conducting separate research and development activities’.187 This 
is the only procedure which can run from the start to the end with one 
economic operator.188 Therefore, even though article 31 of the Innovation 
Partnership refers to article 65 of the Directive with regard to limiting the 
number of candidates to be invited (including the obligatory minimum 
number),189 the first provision acts as a special rule towards the latter 
184 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 31(1); Albert Sànches-Graells, ‘Innovation Partnershi-
ps under Reg 31 Public Contracts Regulations 2015 <http://howtocrackanut.blogspot.
com/2015/04/innovation-partnerships-under-reg-31.html> accessed 23 April 2015.
185 Sànches-Graells offers a curious assessment of the position of economic operators under 
this presumption. He notices that the pool of potential contractors will be reduced only to 
those who also believe a solution is non-existent and to those ‘willing to play along’, who will 
confirm the authorities’ improper assessment and then offer an already existing solution by 
faking or duplicating the innovation process. Sànches-Graells (n 184).
186 Telles (n 183).
187 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 31(1) (emphasis added).
188 Telles (n 183)
189 ‘The contracting authorities shall indicate, in the contract notice or in the invitation to 
confirm interest (...) the minimum number of candidates they intend to invite and, where 
appropriate, the maximum number. In the restricted procedure the minimum number of 
candidates shall be five. In the competitive procedure with negotiation, in the competitive 
dialogue procedure and in the innovation partnership the minimum number of candidates 
shall be three. (...) However, where the number of candidates meeting the selection criteria 
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as a general rule.190 In spite of the obligation of the contracting authority 
to treat economic operators equally,191 due to such wording there is the 
potential to restrict competition and favour certain economic operators. 
The second way in which a contracting authority and/or his/her 
partner may misuse innovation partnership can be found in the vaguely 
expressed provision of the directive regarding the interrelationship be-
tween the value of the investment and the duration of the partnership.192 
Article 31(7) of the 2014/24 Directive states:
The contracting authority shall ensure (...) the duration and val-
ue of the different phases reflect the degree of innovation of the 
proposed solution (...). The estimated value of supplies, services 
or works shall not be disproportionate in relation to the invest-
ment required for their development.
Under wording like this, many costs can be attributed to the in-
vestment required for development (for example, examining the available 
solutions, modification and adaptation of the necessary tools, etc), and 
the time needed to conduct each phase and for research, development, 
manufacturing and supply is hardly estimated by anyone outside the 
partnership.193 As Telles puts it: ‘a resulting partnership can last for a 
long time before anyone can start asking questions’.194
Another major issue associated with the innovation partnership is 
its compatibility and potential interference with the ‘2014 Framework 
for State aid for research and development and innovation’ (hereinafter: 
R&D&I).195 The potential to circumvent the latter set of rules with the use 
of innovation partnership has been discussed among academics.196
and the minimum levels of ability as referred to in Article 58(5) is below the minimum num-
ber, the contracting authority may continue the procedure by inviting the candidates with 
the required capabilities’. Directive 2014/24/EU, art 65(2).  
190 Telles (n 183). 
191 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 18.
192 Telles (n 183). 
193 ibid. 
194 ibid.
195 Communication from the Commission — Framework for State aid for research and de-
velopment and innovation [2014] OJ C198/1 (Framework for R&D&I State aid): ‘The EU’s 
R&D&I state aid rules are set out in two complementary texts: the new General Block Ex-
emption Regulation (GBER) sets out the conditions under which state aid may be granted 
without prior notification to the Commission. The new Framework, in turn, sets out the 
criteria under which the Commission will assess R&D&I aid measures which have to be 
notified by MSs because they have a higher potential for distorting competition’. European 
Commission, ‘Commission Adopts New Rules Facilitating Public Support for Research, De-
velopment and Innovation’ (Press Release, 21 May 2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-14-586_en.htm> accessed 24 November 2015.
196 Sànches-Graells (n 184).
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To help reach the targets of the ‘Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth’, the Commission worked on the State 
Aid Modernisation package.197 One of the key components of this package 
is the R&D&I which sets out the conditions under which MSs can grant 
State aid to companies to carry out R&D&I activities, but at the same 
time limiting distortions in the Single Market.198
The Framework allows public procurement of research and devel-
opment services and considers it to be, in principle, in compliance with 
article 107 TFEU, ie not granting State aid incompatible with the internal 
market in two cases that are not two cumulative conditions:
[a]s long as an open tender procedure for the public procurement 
is carried out in accordance with the applicable directives (...);199 
and
[i]n all other cases (...) where the price paid for the relevant ser-
vices fully reflects the market value of the benefits received by the 
public purchaser and the risks taken by the participating provid-
ers, when a number of conditions are cumulatively met;200 one of 
which is relevant to mention.201 
 
The procurement does not give any of the participating providers any 
preferential treatment in the supply of commercial volumes of the final 
products or services to a public purchaser in the MS concerned.
The innovation partnership procedure, as discussed above, is not 
an open but a restricted and a negotiated procedure with the potential to 
favour one economic operator from the start to the end. Thus, it cannot 
197 The modernisation of State aid policy focused on facilitating aid targeted at market fail-
ures and the objectives of common European interest. Part of the focus was also on cases 
with the biggest impact on the internal market, streamlining rules and taking faster deci-
sions. European Commission, Press Release (n 195); for more, see Erika Szyszczak, Resear-
ch Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar 2011).
198 European Commission, Press Release (n 195).
199 Framework for R&D&I State aid (n 195) para 32.
200 Others are: a) the selection procedure is open, transparent and non-discriminatory, and 
is based on objective selection and award criteria (...); b) the envisaged contractual ar-
rangements describing all rights and obligations of the parties (...) are made available to all 
interested bidders in advance of the bidding procedure. Framework for R&D&I State aid (n 
195) para 33.
201 Sànches-Graells also discusses the fourth condition requiring that: a) all results that do 
not give rise to IPR may be widely disseminated, for example through publication, teach-
ing or contribution to standardisation bodies in a way that allows other undertakings to 
reproduce them, and any IPR are fully allocated to the public purchaser; or b) any service 
provider to which results giving rise to IPR are allocated is required to grant the public 
purchaser unlimited access to those results free of charge, and to grant access to third par-
ties, for example by way of non-exclusive licences, under market conditions. However, the 
problematics of IPR go beyond the scope of this paper. Sànches-Graells (n 184).
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fit under the first condition.202 As regards the alternative case, innovation 
partnership, by definition, including the development and subsequent 
purchase of the procured good, work or service, does create ‘preferential 
treatment for the supply of the results of the innovation’.203 In the opinion 
of the authors, repayment of all investment costs eliminates most of the 
risk for the economic operator and creates preferential treatment for the 
operator’s output on the market.
In conclusion, there is the possibility of anti-competitive behaviour 
of the contracting authority in the short-term, but also the potential for 
deferred anti-competitive effects once the procured subject enters the 
commercial market.204 When the product, or a certain solution for a work 
or a service, finds itself in competition with products that were developed 
and placed on the market without any intervention of the MS in any form, 
there are risks of anti-competitive effects.
In spite of the lack of compatibility with the provisions of the Frame-
work, the contracting authority may continue with the award of the 
innovation partnership according to paragraph 34, stating that if ‘the 
conditions in point 33 are not fulfilled, MSs may rely on an individual 
assessment of the terms of the contract (...) but without prejudice to the 
general obligation to notify R&D&I aid pursuant to Article 108(3) of the 
Treaty’.205 This would mean an obligation to inform the Commission and 
to stay with the procedure until the Commission’s final decision declaring 
that such a plan is compatible with the internal market.206
Given the above, innovation partnership can be considered as the 
first type of Public Private Partnership (hereinafter: PPP) regulated by 
European public procurement legislation. In PPP, partners can have vari-
ous shares, and, accordingly, different rights and obligations. This would 
be the case in particular if the participation of the MS is led by consid-
erations other than commercial ones, so that it would be willing to ac-
cept less favourable terms. Nevertheless, in public – private cooperation 
through the innovation partnership, in line with the acid test and the 
‘market economy investor/consumer principle’, PPP may create undue 
economic advantage for the private partner when no market operator 
would accept participating on the same terms as the public partner. The 
202 ibid.
203 ibid.
204 Sànchez-Graells (n 74) 16.
205 Framework for R&D&I State aid (n 195) para 34.
206 ‘The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its com-
ments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compatible 
with the internal market having regard to Article 107, it shall without delay initiate the pro-
cedure provided for in paragraph 2. The MS concerned shall not put its proposed measures 
into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision’. Art 108(3) TFEU.
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terms and conditions governing investments and the subsequent han-
dling of the results are not equal for the public and private partner. This, 
for example, is the case when the latter is guaranteed a certain rate of 
return, or when the conditions of debts and loans are all considerably 
more favourable for the private partner.207
As explained above, not every PPP (or, for that matter, innovation 
partnership) with uneven terms will contain disguised State aid.208 This 
is especially the case if the acid test is applied with the presumption 
that the awarding of an innovation partnership compliant with the direc-
tives rules out State aid incompatible with the internal market. Even in 
this situation, shortcomings in the innovation partnership as a procure-
ment procedure discussed previously remain unaltered, and thus must 
be borne in mind.
Research and innovation play a key role in the ‘Europe 2020’ strat-
egy, and public authorities are encouraged to make the best strategic use 
of public procurement to spur innovation.209 Public purchase oriented 
towards innovative products and services is seen as a way to ‘improve the 
quality and efficiency of public services at a time of budget constraints’.210 
For these reasons, the new directives have introduced considerable flex-
ibility in the choice of competitive dialogue and negotiated procedures, 
and at the same time have created the innovation partnership procedure.
But, in the authors’ view, the legal set up of innovation partnership 
has too many weak spots to be trusted. The inability of the MS to place 
any restrictions on the use of this procedure unreasonably restricts its 
right to regulate the behaviour of bodies governed by public law. Access 
to probably the most complex procedure for potentially inexperienced au-
thorities is wide open, which can result in something very different from 
the intended gain of value for money. High levels of discretion enjoyed by 
the contracting authority, particularly facilitated by the right to run an 
innovation partnership from start to finish with a single supplier, bear 
a considerable risk of anti-competitive behaviour. The negative effect of 
this practice might be observed not just in the short term, as wrongful or 
at least deficient behaviour of the contracting authorities, but also in the 
long term, in regard to the relationship between those solutions and the 
ones created solely on the market without public interference. 
With the aim of encouraging innovative solutions, which would in 
turn bring about industrial and overall growth, the new directives, in 
207 For a broader discussion of PPP and how to ensure its compliance with State aid rules, 
see Nicolaides and Schoenmaekers (n 73).
208 ibid 59.
209 Recital to Directive 2014/24/EU, para 47.
210 Green Paper (n 114) 44.
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the authors’ view, ‘rushed’ with procedures like innovation partnership. 
The vague and incoherent provisions of the directive could be (too) easily 
circumvented by the public sector, intentionally or unintentionally, re-
sulting in the inappropriate use of taxpayers’ money. Hence, the authors 
believe that the directives have their shortcomings. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union would have to introduce 
more rigid limitations in its interpretation of the provisions of the direc-
tive concerned with the innovation partnership. Although the question is 
whether or not there is room for such an interpretation in the directive 
itself, the authors believe that such more rigid limitations in the inter-
pretation of the provisions of the directive are needed both to prevent 
potential misuse and to ensure the safe and useful application of the 
innovation partnership procedure. The authors believe that in this case 
the new public procurement directives are also a step back for growth in 
the ‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’.
4 Conclusion
The EU has rightly identified the importance and the far-reaching 
significance of public procurement rules. There is no better argument for 
such a conclusion than the fact that the EU has decided to use the new 
public procurement directives as one of the key means to achieve the 
goals of ‘Europe 2020 for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’. Two 
main goals are set with the modernisation of the general and utilities di-
rectives: to ensure value for money in public purchases and to use public 
procurement procedures to support different policies.
The authors have examined the impact of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy 
on the new public procurement directives. Further, they have taken a 
critical approach towards the provisions of the 2014 directives, and dis-
cussed coherence with the rules prohibiting State aid that is incompat-
ible with the internal market. 
Unfortunately, it appears that what you gain somewhere, you lose 
elsewhere. Although the impact of ‘Europe 2020’ on public procurement 
rules may be beneficial for enhancing the use of environmental and so-
cial considerations, it may create the risk of discrimination and have a 
negative effect on the interrelationship of public procurement and State 
aid rules. 
While the prohibition of discrimination is one of the main principles 
of EU law governing every policy, the State aid rules from the TFEU are 
important to ensure that competition in the EU internal market is not 
distorted by the intervention of one MS in favour of an undertaking. In 
connection with the public procurement rules, State aid rules make sure 
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that contracting authorities go for ‘value for money’ in their purchases, 
and that the public procurement procedure is open and fair at the entire 
EU level.
The authors are critical of the new public procurement directives 
because they believe that a more flexible approach to negotiation pro-
cedures and innovation partnership, with the consequence of higher 
discretion enjoyed by the contracting authority, leads to a higher risk 
of unequal treatment and the opportunity to grant disguised State aid. 
Moreover, the authors point to the lack of coherence between the public 
procurement directives and the developing case law on State aid rules. 
The inability of ‘Europe 2020’ and the modernised directives to ensure 
coherence among the different branches of the legal system endangers 
not just the rule of law, but may also be counterproductive to growth, as 
one of the aims.
The issue of broadening the scope of the subject matter is a perfect 
all-in-one example: although it allows broader implementation of envi-
ronmental and social considerations, at the same time it opens the way 
for discrimination and is potentially detrimental to State aid rules.
In light of the risks of the new public procurement directives and the 
developing case law concerning State aid, highlighted in the landmark 
case La Poste, the authors believe that the compliance of contracting au-
thorities with public procurement rules can no longer presume that no 
State aid was granted. The acid test has turned sour.
Doing everything that we can to solve problems and using every tool 
available to achieve certain goals may be tempting, especially when the 
goals are nothing but noble. But the road to hell is paved with good 
intentions. The implementation of ‘Europe 2020’ in the new public pro-
curement directives is a good example of how certain measures may 
bring unintended harm. There is a plethora of possible means for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth, and the EU should choose them cau-
tiously so as not to cause a negative trade-off as regards its other policies 
and rules. The authors advocate great caution to ensure the proper and 
effective application of the 2014/24 and 2014/25 directives and to avoid 
their (intentional or unintentional) misuse.
